The Basic Aspects of the Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis by Rozmainsky, I.
I. Rozmainsky 
32 
Економічний вісник Донбасу № 4(50), 2017 
 
 
UDC 336.018:330.834 
I. Rozmainsky, 
National Research University – Higher School of Economics, 
The Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences of St.Petersburg State University 
 
THE BASIC ASPECTS OF THE HYMAN MINSKY’S FINANCIAL  
INSTABILITY HYPOTHESIS 
 
Introduction: Minsky about Keynes’s theory,  
uncertainty, money and investments 
 
Minsky was a leading advocate of Post Keynesian-
ism, one of the main heterodox schools of modern eco-
nomic thought. Developing the underlying principles of 
the Post Keynesian school, Minsky showed that 
Keynes’s main ideas had been treated incorrectly, while 
many of them were simply omitted by J. R. Hicks,  
A. Hanses, and other proponents of traditional Keynesi-
anism1. 
“Decision-making under uncertainty, the cyclical 
nature of the capitalist process, and financial relations of 
an advanced capitalist economy” (Minsky, 1975. P. ix) 
are what Minsky referred to as the elements of Keynes’s 
theory lost in traditional Keynesianism. The very main 
aspect is the first one. A capitalist economy exists in a 
historical time where “its past is given and cannot be 
changed, and… its future is uncertain and cannot be 
known.”2 
The Post Keynesian perception of uncertainty is 
radically different from mainstream (in particular, neo-
classical) one. According to the Post Keynesian ap-
proach, uncertainty is the situation when agents do not 
know both quantity of possible future events and proba-
bilities of these events. Therefore, the probability theory 
is irrelevant for an analysis of situations in which uncer-
tainty takes place (Davidson, 1991). As Keynes (1937. 
P. 213 – 214) wrote: “By “uncertain” knowledge, let me 
explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is 
known for certain from what is only probable. The game 
of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; 
nor is the prospect of a Victory bond being drawn. Or, 
again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. 
Even the weather is the only moderately uncertain. The 
sense in which I am using the term is that in which the  
 
                                                        
1 It is the models of traditional Keynesians that form the basis for introductory macroeconomics courses, and it is according 
to these models that Keynesianism is judged. At the same time, it should be remembered that those models do not fit well into 
the modern mainstream – although they are slightly better than the theory of Keynes himself or Post Keynesian elaborations – 
primarily because many of them are not based on microeconomic foundations. 
2 The quote belongs to B. Moore and is taken from: (Arestis, 1988. P. 42). 
3 This thesis is correct with respect to commodity money. Credit money is often characterized by endogeneity (see below), 
which is why this assertion cannot be applied to it. It is, however, characterized by a zero labor intensity, just like commodity 
money. 
 
prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of 
copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, of the 
obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of pri-
vate wealth-owners in the social system in 1970. About 
these matters there is no scientific basis on which to 
form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do 
not know”. We can say that uncertainty is the essential 
feature of any economic system characterized use of  du-
rable assets and high degree of the division of labor. In 
a such system all agents are interdependent in a real 
time; future successes and failures of each agent de-
pends upon the decisions of the others, and there are no 
opportunities to predict the future variables. 
To provide protection from the uncertainty money 
is created as an absolutely liquid and reliable asset. 
However, money cannot be readily produced, as was 
pointed out by Keynes in his General Theory in Chapter 
17.3 Consequently, increasing (decreasing) the demand 
for money by decreasing (increasing) the demand for 
productive assets “responsible” for national income and 
employment will lead to a recession (recovery) in an 
economy. This lays the basis of the cyclical nature of a 
capitalist economy. The point is the following. When 
agents increase demand for money or other non-produc-
tive assets, real GDP and employment will not increase. 
But decreasing demand for fixed capital and other pro-
ductive assets will lead to falling GDP and employment. 
The outcome is a recession. And visa verse: increasing 
demand for productive assets – that is, productive in-
vestments – together with decreasing demand for non-
productive liquid assets including money will generate 
economic expansion. So, business cycles are turned to 
be the endogenous phenomenon which is inherent for 
the market capitalist economy. This conclusion is ex-
plicitly inconsistent with the neoclassical doctrine of the 
market economy’s stability.  
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Investments in more details: endogenous money 
supply and two price levels 
 
The described cyclicity can be aggravated by the 
complex financial relationships that enable greater in-
vestments during a recovery phase, while resulting in a 
heavy debt burden for investors during a recession. 
Thus, Keynes’s theory asserts a cyclical instability in-
herent in capitalist economies. Those are the very as-
pects that were lost in traditional Keynesian macroeco-
nomic theory, while the theory of Keynes himself1 
wound up as just a specific case of the neoclassical the-
ory. 
These circumstances encouraged Minsky to assert 
an inherent relationship between traditional Keynesian-
ism and neoclassical theory. He argued that both ap-
proaches were “based upon a barter paradigm – the im-
age is of a yeoman or craftsman trading in a village mar-
ket” (Minsky, 1975. P. 57). His own approach “rests 
upon a speculative financial paradigm – the image is of 
a banker making his deals on a Wall Street” (Minsky, 
1975. P. 58). 
Minsky also noted that in some of his articles 
(Keynes, 1937; 1939), published after General The-
ory..., the British economist described the processes of 
accumulating fixed capital and its financing, thereby 
laying the foundation for the endogenous money supply 
theory. According to Keynes, the acquisition of capital 
is immediately preceded by a businessman receiving the 
money (“finance” according to his terminology) from fi-
nancial institutions. The latter’s creation of money by 
providing credit to investor firms serves as a necessary 
condition for investment. However, Keynes did not ex-
pressly formulate this thesis, which is only implied in 
his theory. Minsky stressed this fact, noting that “in a 
capitalist economy, money is tied up with the process of 
creating and controlling capital assets.” (Minsky, 1986.  
P. 223). In other words, money is an asset created within 
an economy, i.e. endogenously, to acquire productive 
assets (first of all, fixed capital)2. 
In the 1950s, Minsky showed that, when faced with 
insufficient reserves, financial institutions satisfy the de-
mand by firms for investment-financing money through 
financial innovations (Minsky, 1957). For example, ex-
ecuting transactions involving repurchase agreements 
(selling and then buying a debt obligation) results in the 
seller immediately receiving money that can be loaned. 
                                                        
1 From the point of view of Minsky and other leading Post Keynesians (P. Davidson, F. Carvalho, L. R. Wray, etc.), the 
most significant elements of the Keynes’s legacy  – and most underestimated in traditional Keynesianism – are Chapters 12 and 
17 of his General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. See in particular: (Davidson, 1972; Carvalho, 1992). 
2 It should be noted that the endogenous money supply concept itself was not invented by Minsky. Many Post Keynesians 
wrote that money is created endogenously in a modern capitalist economy (Arestis, 1988; Chick, 1992; Davidson, 1972; Wray, 
1992). But Minsky’s contribution is that he identified a relationship between money supply dynamics combined with its struc-
tural changes due to the emergence and spread of more liquid money aggregates, on the one hand, and the process of accumu-
lating fixed capital through productive investments, on the other. 
3 Keynes himself did not put particular stress on the differences between values for these two types. 
4 The terms “borrower risk” and “lender risk” were first suggested by Keynes in Chapter 11 of the General Theory. How-
ever, they were lost by his immediate followers. 
Later, Minsky and other Post Keynesians pointed to im-
portant financial innovations: using deposit certificates 
and foreign exchange loans, securitization (converting 
bank loans into securities), and off-balance sheet activ-
ity. This latter type of innovation may be expressed, for 
example, through issuing “facilities” to several firms in 
the form of an obligation to provide loans in certain 
amounts upon their demand, etc. (Chick, 1992). This 
type of financial evolution reduces the efficiency of the 
central bank’s monetary policy and enhances the en-
dogeneity of the money supply. 
Minsky built on the ideas contained in Chapter 17 
of the General Theory, showing that the value of any 
long-term asset is determined by its own rate of interest. 
Simply put, this indicator is the sum of all benefits re-
ceived from an asset, less its carrying costs. Those ben-
efits include not only monetary proceeds (pecuniary 
yield) but also the implicit advantages of owning it, e.g., 
high liquidity. It should be stressed that all of the above 
benefits are anticipated and not actual values3. 
According to Minsky, an asset’s own rate of inter-
est is none other than the demand price for that asset, 
reflecting its attractiveness as perceived by a particular 
investor (or the market as a whole). There is also the as-
set’s supply price. It is nothing more than the price of its 
production and is determined by the sum of the average 
cost and (affected by the market power) markup, as is 
the case with imperfect competition, which was usually 
assumed by Minsky and other Post Keynesians. Thus, a 
capitalist economy is characterized by two price levels. 
One of these levels depends on the conditions of asset 
production, while the other depends on the capitalized 
value of anticipated income from their use. The amount 
of investment in an asset is determined by the relation-
ship between the demand and supply prices. Strictly 
speaking, investments in an asset will be made only if 
the demand price is equal to or exceeds the supply price. 
However, these price levels are not the only invest-
ment factors. Unless firms seek the assistance of finan-
cial institutions and the market to finance their invest-
ments, there is a serious limitation on investments in the 
form of internal financial resources (funds). Whenever 
external financing is used for investments, additional 
determinants of investments appear, i.e., the lender risk 
and the borrower risk4. The first risk relates to the con-
cerns of banks and other financial institutions that the 
borrower might not be able to repay the debt. The se- 
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cond risk is associated with the borrower firm’s con-
cerns that it might not be able to repay the loan. Both 
risks are directly correlated to financial leverage, i.e., the 
ratio of an economic entity’s debt (in this case, the in-
vestor firm) to its equity. Increasing the amount of in-
vestments financed through debt will sooner or later en-
tail an increase in the lender and borrower risks, which 
will limit their value. 
Thus, the function of investments includes factors 
reflecting the uncertainty of the future and the degree of 
pessimism or optimism (we can remember “animal spir-
its” described by Keynes in Chapter 12 of  his General 
Theory) by economic entities. It is these factors, rather 
than the determinants associated with the current top 
productivity of capital (as in neoclassical theory), that 
play an important part in determining the amount of in-
vestments. Furthermore, the variables in the investment 
function reflecting the financial condition of investors 
are equally important. Thus, the amount of investment 
by a firm depends on its liability structure. 
 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis  
as the theory of cycles and crises 
 
The financial instability hypothesis (hereinafter re-
ferred to as the FIH) is based on Minsky’s theories of 
money, financial evolution and investment, as well as on 
I. Fisher’s concept of debt deflation (Fisher, 1933)1. Ac-
cording to this concept, the downward trends in an econ-
omy are aggravated by lowering prices (supply prices in 
Minsky’s terms), as such a reduction makes real debt a 
heavier burden, leading to insolvency and bankruptcy 
for many production units. 
The FIH is the basis for the “theory of how a capi-
talist economy endogenously generates a financial 
structure which is susceptible to financial crises” (Min-
sky, 1983. P. 289-290). A financial structure here is “the 
market interactions between borrowers and lenders and 
the balance sheets of non-financial firms, intermediaries 
and households that reflect these interactions” (Pollin, 
1994. P. 97). According to the FIH, economic trends are 
largely determined by the way in which firms finance 
their fixed capital investments. In the beginning of the 
increasing stage of the business cycle (recovery phase), 
hedge finance prevails, where current monetary pro-
ceeds are sufficient for firms to repay debt including in-
terest. This type of financing is, to a great extent, de-
pendent on the firm’s heavier reliance on internal finan-
cial sources rather than on external funds. An explana-
                                                        
1 Minsky believed that his financial instability hypothesis was created under the influence of ideas by Keynes, Fisher, and 
also Simons (Simons, 1936. P. 130) who was the first to note the dangers associated with the endogenous creation of money 
through short-term financing of long-term investment projects. On Minsky’s earlier studies, see: (Toporowski, 2008). 
2 This financing technique was named after a Boston banker, C. Ponzi, who, immediately after the First World War, en-
gaged in financial speculations similar to those that were applied decades later in post-Soviet Russia by financial companies, 
such as MMM. 
tion is that during the recovery phase, the recent depres-
sion is still fresh in the memories of economic entities. 
This is why lender and borrower risks are still high. 
However, those memories fade gradually, particu-
larly because national income created through hedge in-
vestments is increasing. Lender and borrower risks are 
decreasing. As Keynes wrote, “during a boom the pop-
ular estimation of the magnitude of both these risks, both 
borrower’s risk and lender’s risk, is apt to become unu-
sually and imprudently low.” (Keynes, 1978. P. 210). As 
a result, firms actively switch to external financing for 
capital investments. Over time, a situation arises where 
the monetary proceeds for many firms are only suffi-
cient to pay interest, but are not enough for the amorti-
zation (repayment) of the respective principals. To save 
themselves from bankruptcy, those firms are force to 
take out new loans to repay the old ones. Minsky called 
this speculative finance. Growing interest rates or fall-
ing money proceeds for firms inevitably transform spec-
ulative finance into Ponzi finance2, where those pro-
ceeds are inadequate even for regular interest payments. 
The only way out of this situation is to increase the 
amount of debt to repay old loans. While speculative fi-
nance is characteristic of the boom phase, Ponzi finance 
leads to recession. This is because, sooner or later, firms 
using this type of financing will become unable to obtain 
new loans, either due to increased lender risks (reflect-
ing the pessimism of financial institutions) or due to the 
general lack of financial resources (money and its sub-
stitutes) in the economy. If firms start to sell their pro-
ductive assets to receive those resources, this will lead 
to a decrease in their demand price, investment levels, 
and, naturally, to an economic crisis. Such crisis can be 
made worse by excessively high borrower risk (resulting 
in lower investments by firms than the amount that 
would have been financed based on internal sources) 
and, particularly, by the demand price for productive as-
sets falling below the supply price. This is because the 
latter case will make the investment process halt alto-
gether. 
Thus, the most important reason for periodic debt 
crises is the systematic inability of firms to repay their 
debts in the financial sector. This is an important con-
clusion of the FIH. Another is that, during a business 
cycle, the financial system becomes more and more 
fragile, i.e. the liquidity of an economic entity balance 
sheet decreases. In other words, a business cycle can  
be perceived as a phenomenon related to changes in the 
financial fragility of an economy (Carvalho, 1992.  
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P. 153)1. Cyclical expansion of business activity is con-
cerned with an accumulation of financial fragility in the 
economy, and such accumulation creates conditions for 
subsequent recession and crisis. 
Minsky generalized the basic provisions of the FIH 
as follows. “The first theorem of the financial instability 
hypothesis is that the economy has financing regimes 
under which it is stable and financing regimes in which 
it is unstable. The second theorem of the financial insta-
bility hypothesis is that over periods of prolonged pros-
perity, the economy transits from financial relations that 
make for a stable system to financial relations that make 
for an instable system.” (Minsky, 1992. P. 7-8). Thus, 
the FIH demonstrates that “stability – or tranquility – in 
a world with a cyclical past and capitalist financial insti-
tutions is destabilizing.” (Minsky, 1985. P. 37). 
 
Conclusions from the Financial Instability  
Hypothesis for economic policy and the causes 
of the Great Recession 
 
Minsky argued for active macroeconomic and in-
stitutional intervention by the government in the econ-
omy. He treated the government’s macroeconomic role, 
first of all, as preventing a financial collapse during re-
cessions and depressions, i.e. maintaining monetary 
proceeds for production and financial units. In his opin-
ion, for this purpose, expansionist fiscal and monetary 
policy should be pursued during recessions. The former 
increases income for the private sector through increas-
ing aggregate demand, enabling many firms to repay 
their debts and avoid bankruptcy. The latter increases li-
quidity of the financial sector, enabling financial insti-
tutions facing bad debts or a mass withdrawal of cus-
tomer deposits to “stay afloat.” According to Minsky, 
this type of intervention saved Western countries from a 
new Great Depression by preventing debt deflation from 
the 1970s through the 1990s. On the other hand, stagfla-
tion was the price to pay for that prevention. 
However, a macroeconomic policy cannot change 
the underlying parameters of advanced modern capital-
ist economies which make them prone to instability. The 
problem is that a repeated policy of government stimu-
lus lulls both firms and banks into a false sense of secu-
rity. As more and more investment projects are success-
fully implemented, economic entities will become more 
                                                        
1 Therefore the financial instability hypothesis is often called also the financial fragility hypothesis. 
2 It should be noted that the idea of financial fragility caught the attention of mainstream economists, represented by the 
New Keynesian economists such as О. Stiglitz, B. Bernanke, etc. This led to the publication of famous articles (Bernanke, 
Gertler, 1990; Greenwald, Stiglitz, 1993) that are considered pioneering works for some reason, although it was Minsky who 
first studied the concept of financial fragility and its role. Moreover, the New Keynesian economists interpreted financial fra-
gility in their accustomed manner as a consequence of asymmetric information. Those authors also did not appeal in any way 
to uncertainty, the special role of money, financial evolution or investment (Wray, Tymoigne, 2008.  P.  3). 
3 The authors of many papers applied the FIH in their analyzes of financial crises in Southeast Asia (Arestis, Glickman, 
2002; Kregel, 1998), Latin America (Cruz, Amann, Walters, 2006; De Paula, Alves Jr., 2000), the Middle East (Dufour, 2006), 
Greece (Argitis, Nikolaidi, 2014) and Eastern Europe (Bezemer, 2001). 
4 Although debt financing of consumption expenditures (not investment) was the main problem, see: Kapeller. Schűtz, 
2015). 
and more reckless. As Minsky noted, “once the doctrine 
of salvation through investment becomes deeply in-
grained into our political and economic system, the con-
straints on foolish investments are relaxed. This is espe-
cially so if the government stands ready to guarantee 
particular investors or investment projects against 
losses” (Minsky, 1985. P. 52). In the Post Keynesian tra-
dition, this phenomenon is usually called the Minsky 
paradox. 
According to Minsky, a capitalist economy can be 
saved from instability through the government’s institu-
tional policy. This policy should consist, first of all, of 
stimulating changes to the aggregate demand and pro-
duction technology structure: the share of consumption 
in the aggregate demand should increase, while technol-
ogy should become more labor intensive. He suggested 
that “an economy that is oriented towards the production 
of consumption goods by techniques that are less capital 
intensive... will be less susceptible to financial instabil-
ity and inflation.” (Minsky, 1985. P. 53). Second, this 
type of policy should require a simpler financial system, 
which would be achieved mainly through limiting short-
term lending for long-term investment projects, i.e. 
through restricting speculative and Ponzi finance. As 
Minsky noted, “the financing of capital asset ownership 
and investment is the critical destabilising phenome-
non” (Minsky, 1980. P. 520)2. While all of these recom-
mendations were suggested as early as the 1980s, they 
remain relevant today. 
Minsky died in 1996, but his ideas were adopted by 
his students around the world3. The Great Recession that 
hit the world 12 years later resulted in active support for 
his ideas (Wray, 2011; Wray, Tymoigne, 2008). From 
the perspective of Minsky’s theory, the main reasons for 
the Great Recession are obvious. The long growth that 
was observed at the turn of the century and was caused, 
in particular, by the specific combination of the devel-
opment of the “new economy” (related to telecommuni-
cations, Internet, etc.), heavy financial innovation and 
globalization processes, increased the financial fragility 
of the entire global economy. This boom caught eco-
nomic entities off guard around the world, and they took 
out many “doubtful” loans and became illiquid and in-
solvent.4 Quite logically, the “payback” was the global 
crisis. Thus, according to Minsky, the Great Recession 
is a consequence of the functioning and evolution of the 
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institutions belonging to the modern advanced capitalist 
economy. Overcoming this crisis and preventing it from 
repeating is impossible without profoundly reforming 
those institutions. Some areas of focus within such re-
forms might include restricting the securitization and 
development of derivative financial instruments, as well 
as the short-term financing of long-term projects. It is 
also desirable to pose stricter requirements on the liquid-
ity of financial institution balance sheets. 
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Розмаїнський І. В. Основні аспекти гіпотези 
фінансової нестабільності Хаймана Мінскі 
У статті розглядаються основні аспекти гіпо-
тези фінансової нестабільності, розробленої Хайма-
ном Мінскі. Ця концепція стала дуже актуальною 
через події, пов'язані з Великою рецесією. Автор ро-
боти демонструє як зв'язки між теорією Кейнса і пі-
дходом Мінскі, так і посткейнсіанський «дух» опи-
суваної гіпотези. Підкреслюється особлива роль не-
визначеності і грошей. Показано, що гіпотеза дозво- 
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ляє зрозуміти, як сучасна ринкова капіталістична 
економіка ендогенно стає «фінансово тендітною» і, 
таким чином, схильною до криз. Автор демонструє, 
що Велику рецесію можна трактувати як наслідок 
процесів, що описуються гіпотезою фінансової не-
стабільності. 
Ключові слова: гіпотеза фінансової нестабіль-
ності, Мінскі, посткейнсианство, фінансова крих-
кість. 
 
Розмаинский И. В. Основные аспекты гипо-
тезы финансовой нестабильности Хаймана Мин-
ски 
В статье рассматриваются основные аспекты 
гипотезы финансовой нестабильности, разработан-
ной Хайманом Мински. Эта концепция стала очень 
актуальной из-за событий, связанных с Великой ре-
цессией. Автор работы демонстрирует как связи 
между теорией Кейнса и подходом Мински, так и 
посткейнсианский «дух» описываемой гипотезы. 
Подчеркивается особая роль неопределенности и 
денег. В статье показано, что гипотеза позволяет по-
нять, как современная рыночная капиталистическая 
экономика энгдогенно становится «финансово 
хрупкой» и, таким образом, подверженной кризи-
сам. Автор демонстрирует, что Великую рецессию  
 
можно трактовать как следствие процессов, описы-
ваемых гипотезой финансовой нестабильности.   
Ключевые слова: гипотеза финансовой неста-
бильности, Мински, посткейнсианство, финансовая 
хрупкость. 
 
Rozmainsky I. The Basic Aspects of the Hyman 
Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis 
This paper considers the basic aspects of the finan-
cial instability hypothesis developed by Hyman Minsky. 
This conception has become very pertinent due to the 
events concerned with the Great Recession. The author 
shows both links between Keynes’s theory and Minsky 
approach and Post Keynesian “spirit” of the described 
hypothesis. The special role of uncertainty and money 
has been emphasized. The paper shows that the hypoth-
esis provides an understanding of how the contemporary 
market capitalist economy endogenously becomes “fi-
nancially fragile” and thus prone to crises. The author 
demonstrates that the Great Recession can be treated as 
a consequence of the processes described by the finan-
cial instability hypothesis. 
Keywords: financial instability hypothesis, Min-
sky, Post Keynesianism, financial fragility. 
JEL: B59, E12, E32, E44, E52. 
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